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.

Tort law remains the most exciting and challenging area of
private law to teach and practice . Tort law reflects. sometimes elegantly. often crudely. the evolving standards of civil conduct . New
York courts last year were. as usual. confronted with litigants seeking to broaden the scope of duty and expand the range of damages.
Most decisions conservatively preserved the legal status quo. some
ventured forth intellectually .Most of the decisions were sound. but
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a few cases were wrongly decided.

Medical malpractice actions continue to occupy much court
time. Although there is no evidence to support the oft-voiced fears
of medical society spokespersons that a crisis again looms in New
York, many cases require reexamination of negligence doctrines as
applied in these often complex cases.

A. Informed Consent
The informed consent doctrine in New York is codified.' The
standard employed is one of reasonableness; the actions of both
patient and physician are measured by what the reasonable person
would have concluded in the circumstance presented?
Lipsius v. Whites presents the typical intermeshing of a cause
of action asserting lack of informed consent with an action for malpractice, in that an unnecessary procedure was allegedly performed.' The trial court, on the defendant's motion, dismissed the
plaintiffs complaint by ignoring both the quality and the quantity
of the plaintiffs allegations that she had suffered injuries because
of the severing of a nerve in her right hand by the defendant. The
court rejected clear factual allegations that she was never informed
of the risks and alternatives to the hand surgery.Vhe plaintiff
also had the benefit of a unanimous panel finding of malpracticed
and expert testimony to buttress her medical malpractice claim.'
It is hard to view Lipsius as anything other than a correction
of a trial court decision that far exceeded law and judicial discretion in rendering a verdict for the defendant doctor. It is regretta1. See N.Y. PUB.HEALTH
LAW3 2805-d ( M c K i e y 1977). New York codified the informed consent doctrine in the hope that its courts would be more restricted in their development of this doctrine than sister jurisdictions following a common-law course.
2. See id. 8 2805-d(l), (3).
3. 91 A.D.2d 271, 458 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d Dep't 1983).
4. Id. a t 272, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t 930.
5. Id. a t 276, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t 932.
6. Id. a t 278,458 N.Y.S.2d a t 933. The panel was convened pursuant to N.Y. JUD. LAW
8 148-a (McKinney 1983) and in this case, unlike many others, had little di5culty finding
improper and negligent actions by the defendant. It is ironic that a panel system which
seldom works properly suffered reversal by a trial judge in a case so obviously presenting
evidence of malpractice.
7. 91 A.D.2d a t 279, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t 934.

Heinonline - - 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 652 1984

19841

Torts

653

ble that the appellate division did not couch its reversal in strong
words of censure of the trial court.
Few specific problems in malpractice law trouble physicians
more than the string of tragic cases arising out of the administration of oxygen to babies in the early 1950's. Blindness resulted in a
number of instances and very large verdicts have been awarded to
the victims, now young adults. As a Washington state court noted,
physicians face enormous damages often after having tried "to
steer their tiny patients between the Scylla of blindness and the
Charybdis of brain damage."s In Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosthe First Department reversed the trial court on the issue of
damage. The court's discussion of informed consent is interesting
because the court affirmed the finding of liability on a broader concept of informed consent than the current codified version.1° Because the procedure in question, the administration of oxygen to
premature infants, was in a "gray area," in regard to risks, when
the plaintiff was blinded by oxygen therapy, the court clearly sustained the concept of informed consent even when the alternative
for the parents was the possible death of their newborn.
The court's acknowledgment that "[iln the summer of 1953 a
significant segment of the medical community continued to believe
that the liberal administration of oxygen to prematures was important in preventing death or brain damage"" underscores the vitality of the informed consent doctrine for establishing liability. With
authorities almost equally divided as to when the procedure in
question became medically unnecessary or too risky to employ routinely, informed consent emerges as the liability theory of choice.
It is apparent that parents of infants blinded by oxygen administration were not properly informed, even by the doctrinal standards of thirty years ago.'*

8. May v. Dafore, 25 Wash. App. 5 7 5 , , 611 P.2d 1275, 1276 (1980).
9. 88 A.D.2d 217, 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1st Dep't 1982).
10. See id. a t 225-26, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t 881.
11. Id. a t 218, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t 887.
12. The specific medical issue in Burton will disappear from the litigation scene when
all plaintiffs' claims are disposed of. The lesson remaining is that developing medical procedures will always create a period of doubt and possible subsequent disavowal. Plaintiffs
seeking to rely upon malpractice theories will face the problem of establishing when a practice was no longer deemed generally acceptable. Thii type of case often creates jury sympathy both for the defendant doctor and the institutional defendant. When adequate facts
indicate a lack of informed consent, this should be the cause of action most vigorously pursued by plaintiffs' counsel.
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An area of duty continuing to develop is that owed to the unborn by a physician. In a case of first instance in the appellate
courts, Hughson v. St. Francis Hospital,18 the Second Department
sustained the viability of a cause of action for prenatal injuries
that allegedly occurred because informed consent was not properly
obtained from the pregnant patient.14 The Hughson court correctly
distinguished the plaintiffs cause of action from those previously
brought under the concept of "wrongful life."16 In Hughson "the
infant at bar was an identifiable being within the zone of danger at
the time of the wrongful act. Thus, this case would appear to fall
squarely within the general rule that a surviving chid has a right
to recover for tortiously inflicted prenatal injuries."16
Hughson is a logical and necessary extension of the doctrine
that physicians owe a duty to those unborn children who enter the
world injured due to the physician's negligent care of the mother.
A child cannot give informed consent and, of course, an infant in
utero is totally dependent on its mother's actions for its health and
safety. Justice Weinstein, in Hughson, cogently established that
the duty concept, based on informed consent, extends to the unborn.17 This extension of duty should not significantly burden physicians because good medical practice dictates that therapy considerations include weighing effects on fetuses.

B. Psychiatry
Psychiatric malpractice actions require factfinding that is
qualitatively different from that in most medical negligence cases.
In Bell v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.,18a jury verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed by the Second Department. The

13. 92 A.D.2d 131, 459 N.Y.S.2d 814 (2d Dep't 1983).
14. Unfortunately, the facts underlying this action were inadvertently pleaded and thus
the nature of the plaintiff's injury could not be reported. The appellate division decided the
appeal on the purely legal issues raised. In the world of medical malpractice, it would have
been useful to know the clinical background of this action, but this presumably may emerge
in subsequent proceedings in this lawsuit.
15. The theory that being born, of itself, can be a legally recognized wrong for which a
remedy, presumably limited to money damages, can be fashioned, has been rejected in New
York. See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 886 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978);
accord Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269,429 N.E.2d 786,445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981).
16. 92 A.D.2d a t 132, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 815-16 (citation omitted).
17. See id. at 133, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
18. 90 A.D.2d 270,456 N.Y.S.2d 787 (2d Dep't 1982).
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plaintiff attempted suicide after being released from Kings County
Hospital. The hospital had treated the plaintiff, who had a long
history of psychopathology, for schizophrenia and had released the
plaintiff despite evidence of suicidal ideation and psychotic
thought content. The usual battle between expert witnesses was
played; the plaintiffs psychiatric authority asserted that the plaintiffs release precipitated the suicide attempt and the defendant's
expert maintained that the plaintiffs wife triggered his attempt at
self-destruction.le
Because most psychiatric malpractice cases raise questions of
judgmental error, which are difficult to resolve, standards for liability must be clearly articulated. The Bell court correctly and succinctly delineated the negligence elements that favored the plaintiffs claim: the inadequacy of the psychiatric examination and the
psychiatrist's admission of departure from good medical practice.
An inadequate record also contributed to the structuring of a picture of negligence.%O
C. The Panel Problem

The medical malpractice panels remain a problem. Designed
to winnow out cases devoid of merit and to encourage settlement
of justified claims, the panels have increasingly become the subject
matter of court motions and disputes. As one trial justice recently
noted, "[elxperience has shown [the panel system] to be a costly
failure. . . ., 3 2 1
The question of physicians' impartiality on a panel was raised
in several cases. The Supreme Court, Onondaga County, held that
an anesthesiologist was disqualified because of his affiliation with

19. Id. a t 277-78, 456 N.Y.S.2d a t 792.
20. See id. a t 282,456 N.Y.S.2d a t 795. The absence of proper documentation remains
an Achilles' heel for defendant physicians and hospitals. In a psychiatric case, where the
observation and evaluation of behavior is usually the central issue, the failure to record and
document observations remains potentially fatal for defendants. Bell reasserts this reality
which attorneys for psychiatrista and hospitals should repeatedly bring to the attention of
their clients.
21. Stone v. Buffalo Gen. Hoap., 117 Misc. 2d 889,890,459 N.Y.S.2d 394,395 (Sup. Ct.,
Erie Co. 1983). The court granted motions to dispense with the panel, accepting movants'
contention that only factual issues were disputed and that panel submission was unnecessary and time-consuming. WhiIe interpreting the Judiciary Law to permit dispensing with
the panel, Justice Bayser clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with the panel system. See id.
(construing N.Y. JUD.
LAW 8 148-a(1) (McKinney 1983)).

Heinonline - - 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 6 5 5 1984

656

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 35:651

the defendant hospital.22The problem highlighted by this case is
that in most malpractice actions outside major urban centers the
designated panelist may well be affected, in one manner or another, by a relationship with the ~ a r t i e s . 2 ~
The issue of bias arose when a law firm that was currently representing a panelist member in a separate matter also represented
a physician appearing before that medical panel.%' In this action,
not only was the panelist disqualified, but it was necessary to vacate the findings of two panels to insure impartiality.e6 The procedure resulted in a waste of time and money for all. Because relatively few lawyers handle much of the medical malpractice defense
work, similar conflicts will arise regularly. The writer suggests that
the panel system as presently constituted should be abandoned
due to a host of deficiencies proven by e x p e r i e n ~ e . ~ ~

D. Other Malpractice Issues
A medical malpractice trial is complicated and judicial decorum is of great importance. The Second Department recognized
this and reversed for a new trial, vacating jury verdicts for the
. ~ ~ court found
plaintiff, in Lopez v. Linden General H o ~ p i t a l The
that the trial judge "routinely interrupted counsel to question the
witnesses in a manner that was at times facetious, at other times
pedantic . . . The gratuitous nature of these intrusions . . . deprived the municipal appellants of a fair trial."28 Shame on the
trial court.

.

22. See King v. Retz, 115 Misc. 2d 836, 454 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co.
1982).
23. The designated panelist in King practiced in the same department as several of the
defendants. If he found that the questioned procedure indicated malpractice, he might be
acting against his own prior medical judgment in similar cases. Id. a t 842-43, 454 N.Y.S.2d
a t 598-99.
24. See Scott v. Brooklyn Hosp., 93 A.D.2d 577, 462 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1983).
25. See id. a t 581-82, 462 N.Y.S.2d a t 275.
26. It is not suggested that alternatives to full-blown trials are not desirable. The goals
of the State, as expressed in the Judiciary Law, see N.Y. JUD. LAW$ 148-a (McKinney
1983), can be met by a corps of full-time physicians who could successfully provide what ad
hoc panel membership fails to achieve-equitable and unbiased medical opinions. With a
surfeit of physicians looming as a probability and with older doctors relu&t to practice
part-time because of malpractice premium rates, a full-time staff of medical specialists
would likely be both workable and economical.
27. 89 A.D.2d 1010,454 N.Y.S.2d 452 (2d Dep't 1982) (mem.).
28. Id. a t 1010-11, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
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A. State and Municipal Entities
The Court of Appeals, in a short and well-reasoned opinion,
abolished the fellow-servant rule in Buckley v. City of New Y ~ r k . ~ ~
Recognizing that "[tlhe theoretical underpinnings of this rule have,
to a large extent, been discredited in recent years,"s0 the Court analyzed the current operation of the rule and found that it worked
to the disadvantage of municipal employees who, in many instances, are denied recourse to workers' om pens at ion.^'
An especially interesting municipal tort duty issue was decided in DeLong v. County of Erie.32This case involved negligence
in dispatching police assistance to a woman who had called the 911
emergency number to report an attempted burglary. The 911 operator failed to obtain proper information from the caller and the
wrong police department was therefore dispatched to a nonexistent
address in its area. Subsequently, the woman calling for help was
sexually assaulted and mortally stabbed.ss Sustaining an award of
$600,000, the aipellate court found the defendants, Erie County
and the City of Buffalo, to be equally liable." The court created a
duty to provide nonnegligent emergency services to persons using
the 911 number.
The providing, or the lack of providing, of police services has
been a fertile ground for negligence actions in New York. For example, the Court of Appeals, through two key cases, has recognized
that liability does not attach to a specific refusal to furnish protec-

29. 56 N.Y.2d 300, 437 N.E.2d 1088, 452 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1982).
30. Id. at 303, 437 N.E.2d a t 1089, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
31. Although the rule was abolished entirely, the largest group that had been affected
by its existence were police officers and firefighters. The rule has been a constant source of
unhappiness to members of these high-risk occupations. For firefighters especially, injuries
a t the hands of negligent fellow-servants, without any other attributable negligent conduct,
are frequent. Municipal governments will face increased liability exposure because of the
rule's extinction but this problem could not justify retention of a nineteenth-century concept. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals, which has demonstrated both its reluctance to
actively advance common-law duties and its preference for legislative action, pointedly emphasized the decisional law ancestry of the fellow-servant rule. See id. a t 304,437 N.E.2d a t
1089-90, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t 333.
32. 89 A.D.2d 376,455 N.Y.S.2d 887 (4th Dep't 1982), afd, 60 N.Y.2d 296,457 N.E.2d
717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983).
33. 89 A.D.2d a t 379, 455 N.Y.S.2d a t 889.
34. See id. at 377, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
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tion based on police evaluation of the request,36although failure to
protect a threatened citizen publicly identified with helping the
. ~ ~ 911 system has further expanded the range
police is t o r t i o u ~The
of police response capabilities while providing local government
with larger, centralized facilities for processing emergency calls.
It is common knowledge in New York, however, that two difficulties exist with the 911 system: 911 operators must process out
nonemergency calls and the operators are not usually police officers. Thus, discretion and competence are required of personnel
who often lack relevant experience and sufficient training. DeLong
clearly warns local governments that they are accountable if they
either fail to establish reasonable procedures for the 911 apparatus
or if such procedures are ignored or overlooked. The harsh reality
recognized by the DeLong court is that "without the critical mistakes in handling the initial transmission and the subsequent failure to conduct a follow-up, a Village of Kenmore police car would
have arrived in time to prevent the attack or to stop the intruder
before he could inflict the final fatal wound to the neck."s7
Two Court of Appeals decisions worthy of brief note involving
and Kush v.
local government are Garrett u. Holiday Inns,
City of Buffalo.3sThe codefendant in Garrett, the Town of Greece,
was found not only to have permitted blatant violations of its
building and fire laws, but to have knowingly issued a false certifi-

35. See Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897
(1968). Linda Riss was threatened with harm by the boyfriend she wished to leave, an attorney. The police failed to protect her and she was almost totally blinded by a thug hired by
the boyfriend. While the writer agrees with the rule announced in Riss, the facts of the case
im provided the police with very specific information
are narrower than the rule it created. R
about threats made to her, see id. at 583, 240 N.E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 899, which
should have been sufficient to require police protection.
36. See Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1958). Arnold Schuster spotted wanted bank robber Willy Sutton on a subway train. His
information led to Sutton's apprehension and Schuster's murder on a Brooklyn street.
Schuster was decided on a public policy basis; a citizen aiding police in the arrest of a
wanted person established a right to be protected from individuals or groups taking a negative view of the citizen's action. See id. a t 86, 154 N.E.2d at 540, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
37. 89 A.D.2d a t 385,455 N.Y.S.2d a t 892. The issue of the decedent's culpable conduct
was never raised. She gave her address as "319 Victoria" without indicating Avenue or
Boulevard. See id. at 378,455 N.Y.S.2d at 889. It is clear from the court's opinion that the
advertising and publicity given to the 911 number was sufficient to place the full onus for
failiig to get a correct address on the police.
38. 58 N.Y.2d 253, 447 N.E.2d 717, 460 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1983).
39. 59 N.Y.2d 26,449 N.E.2d 725,462 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1983).

Heinonline - - 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 658 1984

19841

Torts

659

cate of occupancy.40The appellant, third-party plaintiffs, advanced
both contribution and indemnification theories against the Town.
The Court of Appeals found that contribution may be imposed
against the municipal corporation. Although the Town owed no
duty to the actual fire victims with regard to the inspection of the
motel and the issuance of permits and certificates, a duty to owners and developers to share the cost of joint tortious activity exists." Indemnity was properly found by the Court of Appeals to be
inappropriate because no allegations were made that the Town was
solely liable on a vicarious liability theory for the fire and subsequent injuries.'%
The issue of proportionate tort liability for local government is
well-raised by Garrett, with a clear analysis provided by the Court
of Appeals. It is important to note that mere negligence in executing governmental duties will not expose a local government to liability through contributi~n.'~In Garrett the defendant Town either deliberately, indeed criminally, colluded with builders or
operators of the motel or the Town was grossly negligent in its inspection and certification procedure. In all likelihood, the former
reason explains the events leading to the fatal fire.
If, as is alleged in the complaints, known, blatant, and dangerous
violations existed on these premises, but the town affirmatively
certified the premises as safe, upon which representation appellants justifiably relied in their dealings with the premises, then a
proper basis for imposing liability on the town may well have
been demonstrated."
In effect, the Town of Greece was found liable for an intentional
tort. The tort in question, if committed by and charged against an
individual, would, in all probability, have constituted a crime. The
Court's holding does not significantly expand local government tort
liability because, hopefully, the type of municipal behavior disclosed by Garrett is a rarity. Certainly the decision must force responsible local government administrators to ensure a high level of
code and ordinance compliance.
The dissent in Garrett is worthy of brief comment. Judge
40. See 58 N.Y.2d at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 721, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778.

41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. at 261-63, 447 N.E.2d at 721-22, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79.
See id. at 263, 447 N.E.2d at 722, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
See id. at 262, 447 N.E.2d at 721,460 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
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Jasen argued that Garrett was factually indistinguishable from
prior Court of Appeals' decisions holding that no liability attaches
to a town for breaching a general rather than a special duty. Citing
Sanchez v. Village of Libert~,'~
in which public assistance recipients were moved into a falsely certified building which subsequently burned, Judge Jasen maintained that the Sanchez finding-no special municipal duty to the victims-precluded the
outcome in G~rrett.'~
The writer suggests that Judge Jasen reversed the basis for
proper analysis. Garrett was correctly decided; Sanchez was not.
Seen retrospectively, the element of reliance raised in Garrett for
developers and investors was even greater in Sanchez. This also
means, of course, that the fire victims themselves should have been
able to plead a special duty to themselves running from the Town.
There is a major difference between the traditional doctrine of no
general duty running from local government to potential victims of
governmental negligence and the hopefully emerging concept of a
municipal entity being held liable for any harm directly flowing
from conscious, and usually corrupt, wrongdoing.
In the second case, Kush v. City of Buffalo," the Court of Appeals confronted the duty issue with regard to injuries sustained by
a child finding chemicals taken from a public school and then
abandoned. The defendant school maintained chemicals for instructional purposes. Two student-employees, perhaps interested
in conducting unauthorized experiments off the school premises,
took a quantity of chemicals and hid them behind a bush where
the eight-year-old plaintiff found the items. The explosion of the
chemicals burned the boy.
The duty found in this case is not one of general supervision
because, under that theory, liability for harm done by students to
others is usually not found against a s~hool.'~Here the school
maintained dangerous chemicals and the duty imposed is to rea-

45. 42 N.Y.2d 876,366 N.E.2d 870,397 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1970), appeal dismissed on other
grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 817,377 N.E.2d 748,406 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978); see also Quinn v. Nadler
Bros., 92 A.D.2d 1013,461 N.Y.S.2d 455 (3d Dep't 1983) (mem.).
46. See 58 N.Y.2d at 265-66, 447 N.E.2d at 723-24, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 780-81 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
47. 59 N.Y.2d 26, 449 N.E.2d 725,462 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1983).
48. See Hoose v. Drumm, 281 N.Y. 54, 22 N.E.2d 233 (1939); Kosok v. Young Men's
Christian Ass'n, 24 A.D.2d 113, 264 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1st Dep't 1965), aff'd mem., 19 N.Y.2d
935, 228 N.E.2d 398, 281 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1967).
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sonably ensure that the chemicals are properly safeguarded.
The Court of Appeals in Kush rejected the defendant's claim
that the act of the student-employees in stealing the chemicals was
beyond the scope of employment. As the Court noted, the
"[dlefendant's duty in this case is not predicated on its status as
an employer. Rather, the control and supervision of school-aged
children present within the building, whether as students or employees, is an essential part of defendant's duty to secure dangerous chemicals from the children's access."49 The Court had little
difficulty disposing of the intervening act defense, noting:
Defendant's duty was to take reasonable steps to secure the dangerous chemicals from unsupervised access by children. By its
very definition, any breach of this duty that leads to injury will
involve an intentional, unauthorized taking of chemicals by a
child. When the intervening, intentional act of another is itself
the foreseeable harm that shapes the duty imposed, the defendant who fails to guard against such conduct will not be relieved of
liability when that act occurs!O
Schools thaipurchase and store hazardous materials must also
bear the responsibility for ensuring that injuries do not result from
the activity. Although grounded in negligence, Kush really announces a standard closer to strict liability because access to chemicals by students, and the likelihood of small amounts being stolen
by them, are both difficult, if not impossible, factors to control.
Compensation of over one and one-half million dollars was
awarded to a paid fireman for permanent injuries sustained because of the explosion of a military weapon a t a training ~ession.~'
The Court of Claims found that the fireman, while a t a state-supported county fire training center, was exposed to a white phosphorus antipersonnel grenade instead of the anticipated smoke
bomb.&*The court correctly found the State to be solely liable for
what should have been denominated gross negligence. Although
the State pled contributory negligence, the court disposed of this
defense.
The claimant had a right to rely on [the state instructor's] repre-

49.
50.
51.
52.

59 N.Y.2d at 32, 449 N.E.2d at 728,462 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 33, 449 N.E.2d at 729, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
See Talbone v. State, 116 Misc. 2d 864, 456 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. C1. 1982).
See id. at 865, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 953.

Heinonline - - 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 661 1984

662

Syracuse Law Review

[vol. 35:651

sentation that the device was a smoke bomb unless he knew or
should have known otherwise. This was not established, since the
only evidence of his possession of the device was in a darkened
area outside the training facility. In addition, the claimant's failure to throw the grenade cannot be assigned as a cause, for he
was acting under the reasonable belief that it was a smoke bomb
and, hence, was harmless. Lastly, the claimant's failure to wear
protective clothing cannot be considered a contributing factor, for
there was no proof that had he done so, his injuries would have
been any less severe.ag

In Ammirati v. New York City Transit A ~ t h o r i t y the
, ~ ~Supreme Court, Kings County, dismissed a claim against the Transit
Authority alleging a failure to prevent or protect a passenger from
injury by a thrown rock. The court correctly identified the gravamen of the complaint as an attack on governmental discretion to
allocate police and other security resources rather than the articulation of a specific duty owed to the plaintiff.66 This type of complaint seems to be filed by victims of crime with increasing frequency. As there is no sign that the Court of Appeals is
considering adopting a wider concept of duty in this area, most of
this litigation is wasteful and unproductive.

B. General
The area of infliction of mental distress was highlighted again
this past year. The most interesting case, while not strictly sounding in negligence, was Garland v. Herrin,66a diversity action. Garland was the civil sequel to a nationally publicized murder case.67

53. Id. a t 869, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
54. 117 Misc. 2d 213, 457 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1983).
55. See id. at 215, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t 740.
56. 554 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Subsequent to the writing of this Survey article,
the Second Circuit reversed the district court. See Garland v. Herrin, No. 1341 (2d Cir. Dec.
8,1983). The Second Circuit found that the district court's analysis was an extension rather
than an application of New York law and was unsustainable. As a result of the Second
Circuit's widely publicized reversal, several New York legislators have announced plans to
introduce bills to create private causes of action in situations similar to Garland.
57. Richard Herrin and Bonnie Garland were lovers. When Garland sought to end the
relationship, Herrin became despondent. In July 1977, Garland discussed her relationship
with Herrin in her bedroom and indicated, according to Herrin, that she wished to date
other men. The only thing definitively known to have followed this conversation was Herrin's bludgeoning of Garland with a hammer. Herrin subsequently told police of his act and
a local officer went to the Garland home and asked the unaware Mrs. Garland to take him to
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The victim's parents brought this action on principle rather than
as a serious quest for money damages from a prison inmate.68Applying New York law, District Court Judge Griesa found that the
murderous and brutal assault on the victim in her own bedroom
constituted a reckless infliction of mental distress on both parents,
even though neither parent witnessed the attack and only the
mother discovered her dying daughter in the home.6s The husband
first saw his daughter at the hospital.
Although not binding, of course, on New York courts, the district court opinion is disturbing. New York, through two key cases,
had previously recognized both a cause of action for mental distress unconnected to physical injurye0and the tort of intentional
In both cases the harm was both
infliction of mental distres~.~'
foreseeable and direct. No New York case has accepted the doctrine of liability for mental harm to persons not witnessing the
commission of a crime or tort, but merely viewing the aftermath in
the form of the victim. The district court gratuitously stated that
"there is no reason to believe that the New York Court of Appeals
would not also approve"62the section of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts creating liability for emotional harm to third parties.6s A
reasonable basis for believing that New York would not adopt that
provision, for a judge sitting in a diversity action, is that it has not
done so.
Further, the Restatement section relied on by Judge Griesa requires the third person to witness the extreme or outrageous behavior, not the aftermath.64The Restatement was not, intended to

the girl's bedroom, where the mother then discovered her battered and dying comatose
daughter. The plaintiff father was notified by telephone and rushed to the hospital. Id. at
311.
58. Personal knowledge of the author.
59. See 554 F. Supp. at 308.
60. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
61. See Halio v. Laurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1961).
62. 554 F. Supp. at 313.
63. Section 46 of the Restatement provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person the actor is subject to liability
if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time,
whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in W i l y
harm.
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS§ 46 (1965).
64. Section 46 provides that a family member must be "present at the time." Id.
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expand liability to compensate those who discover the victims of
crime, such as Mrs. Garland, and even less so to compensate those
summoned by telephone to the hospital. While a description of the
murder of Bonnie Garland evokes horror, more so because of the
mother's discovery of the dying girl, there is no basis in New York
law to support this diversity-action verdict.66No doubt others who
suffer genuine emotional harm under like circumstances will attempt to have the New York courts follow Garland. Unless a new
right is articulated, Garland provides no basis for such a theory of
recovery.
Several other cases deserve brief mention. Following accepted
New York doctrine, the Second Department denied the existence
of a cause of action predicated solely on the emotional distress of a
mother witnessing her baby's death because of negligent medical
care.66A guest's complaint that being prematurely and negligently
checked out of a hotel justified damages for emotional harm was
dismissed under the theory of triviality?' Emotional distress, as
the sole harm resulting from the delivery of a stillborn infant, allegedly because of negligence, is not actionable without physical
injuries?* Finally, mental distress resulting from the negligent repair of a car does not add up to a cause of action.69It is fortunate
that the court denied this cause of action or else the courts would
truly have been unmanageably flooded by continually distressed
motorists.

C. Specific Problem Areas
As always, persistent issues arose last year in both old and new
forms. The question of infant liability for negligence was presented
in the context of a car damaged by keys thrown by an eleven-year-

65. The district court correctly noted that "both the New York courts and the drafters
of the Restatement are concerned about the need to impose appropriate limits on liability
for a somewhat intangible injury such as emotional distress." 554 F. Supp. a t 314. It is hard
to know what limits can be raised when so often persons discover crime's dead or wounded
victims.
66. See Quijije v. Lutheran Medical Center, 92 A.D.2d 935,460 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't
1983) (rnem.).
67. See Pollock v. Holsa Corp., 114 Misc. 2d 1076,454 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct. App. T.,
1st Dep't 1982).
68. See Friedman v. Meyer, 90 A.D.2d 511,454 N.Y.S.2d 909 (2d Dep't 1982) (mem.).
69. See Ford v. Village Imports, Ltd.,92 A.D.2d 717,461 N.Y.S.2d 108 (4th Dep't 1983)
(rnem.).
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old child.?O The child was engaged in a game with playmates. The
court found that an eleven-year-old child was capable of following
the reasonable standard of care demanded by the situation. The
plaintiff failed, however, to have the court impose liability on the
key-throwing child's parent under General Obligations Law section
3-112.71 That statute creates liability when a child "willfully, maliciously or unlawfully" destroys pr0perty.7~The court noted that
the plaintiffs key to proving the parents' liability rested on showing a purpose on the child's part other than play. Because the facts
tended to demonstrate that the negligent defendant was ~laying,?~
access to the "deep pocket" was denied.
A second child-related case involved the theory of negligent
entrustment." A motorist, sued for injuring a child on a
skateboard, counterclaimed against the injured child's father. The
appellate division dismissed the counterclaim on the sole finding
that a skateboard is not a dangerous in~trument.?~
Few interesting gross negligence actions were decided during
deserves
this Survey year, but Veals u. Consolidated Edison CO.?~
brief mention. The plaintiff, characterized by the court as "a quiet
sufbut feisty professor of gerontology at Columbia Uni~ersity,"~~
fered the loss of residential electrical service even though the defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff had paid all of his bills in
a timely manner. The defendant clearly went its own bureaucratic
way without reference to the facts or proper procedure. The civil
court judge correctly concluded that such actions
went far beyond mere negligence or carelessness. I find that the
actions of Con Edison fit the test applicable for a finding of gross
negligence. The striking fact here is that Con Edison admitted
that the customer had paid his bill but proceeded to sever his

70. See Deliio v. Cangialosi, 117 Misc. 2d 105,457 N.Y.S.2d 396 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Kings
Co. 1983).
71. See id. a t 107, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t 398.
LAW 3 3-112 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
72. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
73. See 117 Misc. 2d a t 107,457 N.Y.S.2d a t 398.
74. The theory of negligent entrustment arises when a parent allows a minor to possess
or operate dangerous instruments. See Nolechek v. Geauale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d
1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978). The finding that an object is a dangerous instrument has
been left to case adjudication.
75. See Young v. Dalidowicz, 92 A.D.2d 242, 248,460 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (2d Dep't 1983).
76. 114 Misc. 2d 626,452 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Kings Co. 1983).
77. Id. a t 627, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t 154.
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utility service anyway despite this kno~ledge.'~
Allegations of gross negligence are appropriate in small claims actions such as Veals and may, in fact, be the only effective deterrent for incompetent public utilities and common carriers who
rarely cause great special damages in nonpersonal injury cases.

IV. STRICT
LIABILITY
A. Products Liability
No major products liability cases were decided last year. Announced decisions reflected the continuation of past doctrine. Perhaps the most interesting discussion was Judge Fuchsberg's dissent
in Gobhai v. KLM Royal Dutch airline^.?^ The Court of Appeals
affirmed, without opinion, the appellate division's dismissal of an
action sounding in strict products liability. The plaintiff had received from her son a pair of slippers which the defendant airline
had given him as part of its first-class trans-Atlantic service. The
plaintiff fell and injured herself a t home allegedly because the slippers, brand new when she removed them from their protective
wrapper, were defective.s0
Judge Fuchsberg cogently analyzed the prevailing confusion in
New York law resulting from the sales-service dichotomy, a concept never rationally and finally delineated in case law, and criticized what he viewed as the majority's "inadmissibly narrow definition of a sale."*' This issue recurs every year with no solution
adequate to either guide counsel or protect injured parties yet in
sight. Judge Fuchsberg also highlighted another perennial New
York products liability issue.
Preliminarily, I note that, though both courts below broadsweepingly referred to the action as though it were one in strict products liability alone, the pleadings, as already indicated, also expressly speak to breach of warranty and, arguably, if liberally
construed, to negligence as well. This oversight is especially
troublesome because, in this area of litigation, pleading (and substantive) categorization has been so beset by a tendency to overlap, that in the past we have thought it worthwhile to comment

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 629, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
57 N.Y.2d 839, 442 N.E.2d 61, 455 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1982) (mem.).
Id. at 842, 442 N.E.2d at 62,455 N.Y.S.2d at 765-66 (Fuchsberg,J., Tinting).
See id. at 841, 442 N.E.2d at 62,455 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
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that "it may be open to a particular plaintiff to base his case on
contract liability or negligence or strict products liability, or on
some combination thereof."8e

Although reflecting his own experience as a plaintiffs trial advocate, Judge Fuchsberg's dissent points out some of the bothersome contradictions in New York's strict products liability law.
The slippers in question here were part of the price of an airline
ticket and were distributed as a distinct product for use during
and after the journey. The plaintiff should have had her day in
court on a product liability theory.
Product-related tort cases often raise choice-of-law issues. In
Bewers v. American Home Products Corp.,sS the defendants
sought to dismiss the plaintiffs' action under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. The plaintiffs, three English couples, demanded
recovery for injuries they believed were caused by using oral contraceptives manufactured by the defendanLS4The contraceptives
were marketed, promoted, and distributed throughout the United
Kingdom.
The court, in denying the motions for dismissal, noted the
grounds for analyzing forum non conveniens motions.86 In this
case, the court found that dismissal would benefit the defendants
by depriving the plaintiffs of their "strongest cause of action, . .
strict products liability."88 Further, the English statute of limitations might well be an absolute bar to bringing the action in the
.~~
the burden carried by the plainUnited K i n g d ~ m Recognizing
tiffs if dismissal was ordered, the court noted:

.

Whether plaintiffs would have an adequate forum in England
if their actions are dismissed in New York is uncertain, at best. If
these cases are conditionally dismissed and plaintiffs' attempt to
bring them in England is rebuffed, they will then have to return
here after significant delay and additional expense. This prospect
imposes on defendants a somewhat heavier burden to show that
New York is an inconvenient forum than they would bear if an

82. Id. a t 843,442 N.E.2d a t 63,455 N.Y.S.2d a t 765 (quoting Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 400, 335 N.E.2d 275, 277, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (1975)).
83. 117 Misc. 2d 991, 459 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1982).
84. Three different oral contraceptives were implicated in the harm claimed by the
women plaintiffs. See id. a t 992-93,459 N.Y.S.2d a t 668-69.
85. See id. a t 994, 459 N.Y.S.2d a t 669.
86. Id. a t 995, 459 N.Y.S.2d a t 670.
87. Id. a t 996, 459 N.Y.S.2d a t 670.
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adequate alternative forum were unambiguously available.88

The convenience issue was also analyzed at length. An important
argument accepted by the court for not dismissing this action was
that
[ulnlike the vast majority of tort cases in which forum non
conveniens is an issue, the instant cases do not arise out of an
accident, which can happen as readily in one place as another.
The tortious acts here alleged involve calculation and decision,
that is, intentional and deliberate conduct. This conduct, the
making of defendants' relevant corporate decisions, is claimed,
without contradiction, to have occurred not in England, but in
New Y ~ r k . ~ '

Necessary proof, witnesses, and documents in all likelihood would
be found more readily in New York than in London.
The defendants argued that to dismiss the actions would show
deference to British policy objectives, which do not include strict
products liability as a cause of action.90The defendants also worried that the trial of this issue in New York would be an unwarranted act of paternalism towards the Mother Co~ntry.~'The
court properly rejected these assertions as groundless. Reaching a
key analytical point, the court held that
[tlhe trend toward uniformity in products liability law, i.e.,
towards consumer protection and the rule of strict products liability, suggests that the courts in this country should be less reluctant to retain jurisdiction over transnational products liability
litigation and certainly less reluctant to apply the forum's strict
products liability law.9P

American companies, doing business in and deriving profit
from a New York base, should not be permitted to hide behind the
often less rigorous laws of forums where injury occurs. Bewers is
one of the most cogently analytical tort lawlchoice-of-law cases of
recent memory. Transnational product liability cases will increase
and Bewers provides a good framework for the choice-of-law dilemmas sure to arise. As the court concluded:

88. Id. at 997, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
89. Id. at 1000,459 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
90. See id. at 1004, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
91. See id. at 1005, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
92. Id. at 1002, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 674.

Heinonline - - 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 668 1984

19841

Torts

669

On the major choice of law issue, New York law should be applied. The complications of international products liability litigation require sensible and easily applicable forum non conveniens
and choice of law rules. New York is the headquarters or the
principal place of business of many multinational corporations. It
should not, however, be merely the center for corporate headquarters but also the leader in developing laws to protect innocent persons from wrongful activities of such corporations, wherever they choose to conduct their operations. New York should
not become the haven of marauding tort-fea~ors.~~

In other products liability actions it was held that strict liability should not apply to the destruction of business papers belonging to guests at a hotel?'
In yet another Dalkon Shield action, Lindsey v. A. H.Robins
CO.,*~the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the
trial court for applying the wrong statute of limitations. The Second Department found that where an infection followed the implantation of a Dalkon Shield, the cause of action accrued with the
injury, not at the date of insertion?= Because much prior case law
sets accrual of the cause of action at the date a foreign object is
introduced into the plaintws body, the court found it necessary to
distinguish its decision from this prior case law.
In sum we hold that an intrauterine device which facilitates
infection is significantly different from dust, asbestos particles, a
hazardous dye, or a thorium dioxide substance which directly and
immediately act upon the body causing injury and that the date
of onset of injury rather than the date of insertion is the accrual
date to be used for computing the limitation of the time for
bringing suit in this kind of c a ~ e . 8 ~

The court's decision in Lindsey reflects the real differences between pathogenic agents that immediately begin causing harm and

93. Id. at 1010, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
94. See Arrow Elec., Inc. v. StoufTer Corp., 117 Mic. 2d 554, 458 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup.
Ct., N.Y. Co. 1982). This case arose from the fatal StoufTer fire in Westchester that killed 26
people. The court relied on the sales-service dichotomy-because there was no sale, there
could be no strict producta liability action.
95. 91 A.D.2d 150, 458 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2d Dep't 1983). The case was set to be argued
before the Court of Appeals on Oct. 25,1983. See Court of Appeals Calendar, 190 N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 17, 1983, at 16, col. 2.
96. 91 A.D.2d at 160, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 607-08.
97. Id.
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the defectively designed product that may or may not cause harm
to the user. Applying the conventional accrual rule to a product
like the Dalkon Shield would deprive its users of any measure of
legal redress for the harm they might
Continuing New York's line of concert of action products liaCentone
"
the
bility cases was Centone v. Schmidt & Sons, I ~ CIn. ~
plaintiff sued Schmidt & Sons for injuries caused by an exploding
bottle. Schmidt & Sons then commenced a third-party action
against five glass bottle manufacturers, its sole suppliers. The bottle could not be traced back to any specific manufacturer.loO
Schmidt & Sons' problem was that it could not establish tortious
conduct on the part of any of the manufacturers and really sought
to rely on the rejected enterprise liability concept.lol The court denied the five third-party defendants' motion for summary judgment pending further discovery by Schmidt & Sons. It is most unlikely that Schmidt & Sons d uncover evidence of the requisite
tortious conduct by the defendants or that the concert of action
theory will be expanded to embrace enterprise liability.

B. Dram Shop
Two cases warranting brief notice were decided this past year
concerning the Dram Shop Act.loa In Kohler v. Wray,lo8the plaintiff sought to expand the operation of the Dram Shop Act to include social guests who contribute towards the cost of the alcoholic
beverages.lMNew York courts had previously limited the operation
of the Act to sales situations and explicitly excluded social
guests.lO% Kohler, the plaintiff was beaten up by a fellow guest

98. A federal court arrived at a similar conclusion in a diversity action involving the
same manufacturer. See Bailey v. A. H. Wins Co., Inc., 560 F. Supp. 833 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
The district court relied on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to strike down a defense that
the plaintiffs action was time barred.
99. 114 Misc. 2d 840,452 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1983).
100. See id. a t 841,452 N.Y.S.2d a t 301.
101. Id. a t 845,452 N.Y.S.2d a t 303; see Sidell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924,163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (enterprise liability theory could not be relied on by women
plaintiffs seeking to hold drug manufacturers liable for injuries sustained by administration
of drug DES to their mothers during pregnancy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
LAW8 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983-1984).
102. See N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.
103. 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct., Steuben Co. 1982).
104. See id. a t 858, 452 N.Y.S.2d a t 833.
105. See, e.g., Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.
1975), aff'd mem., 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (2d Dep't 1976). The court sent what
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who was served beer by the defendants. The plaintiff maintained
that his five dollar contribution transformed the party situation
and made the hosts sellers under the Dram Shop Act.lo6This contention was rejected by the court, as Edgar dictated it must be.lo7
A more complex problem was presented in Wright v. Sunset
Recreation, Inc.lo8 PlaintSs decedent was killed by an allegedly
drunken driver who had been served liquor, while intoxicated, in a
bowling alley by waitresses from a tavern housed in the same
building. The defendant owned the structure. The court found that
no sale was made by the defendant and that the failure to allege
such a sale was a fatal defect where liability under the Dram Shop
Act was sought.loSThe court rejected the plaintSs theory that a
beneficial relationship existed between the defendant and the
tavern.svc20,110] loS
The writer believes that a quasi-sale by the defendant occurred which is within the Dram Shop Act. Here, both the tavern
and the bowling alley shared a common forename, occupied the
same quarters, and the bar's waitresses roamed through the bowling alley soliciting and filling orders. The defendant possibly assisted drunken bowlers in purchasing liquor from its tenant from
whom it received, minimally at least, rent. Possibly the defendant
also received some other remuneration from the sale of alcohol by
the tavern. The dismissal of the complaint precluded the plaintiff
from adducing proof to show the defendant should be considered a
seller under the Dram Shop Act and was, at best, premature.

A. Abusive Discharge
The Court of Appeals decided in Murphy v. American Home
Products Corp.ll1 that no cause of action for abusive discharge exists in New York. Murphy is one of the most important decisions

should have been a clear message in Edgar that the Dram Shop Act was to be narrowly
construed. The sale of a beverage by a licensed business was a sine qua non for invoking the
Act. Apparently the message was not received by all.
106. See 114 Misc. 2d at 858,452 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
107. See id.
108. 91 A.D.2d 701, 457 N.Y.S.2d 606 (3d Dep't 1982) (mem.).
109. See id. at 701,457 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
110. See id.
111. 58 N.Y.2d 293,448 N.E.2d 86,461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
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of the Court of Appeals this past year because it forecloses actions
that other jurisdictions increasingly recognize. The plaintiff in
Murphy alleged that he had been dismissed for "blowing the whistle" to top management about accounting irregularitiesll' and because of his age.lls
The Court of Appeals recognized the increasing acceptance of
a cause of action in tort for abusive discharge.
Those jurisdictions that have modified the traditional at-will
rule appear to have been motivated by conclusions that the freedom of contract underpinnings of the rule have become outdated,
that individual employees in the modern work force do not have
the bargaining power to negotiate security for the jobs on which
they have grown to rely, and that the rule yields harsh results for
those employees who do not enjoy the benefits of express contractual limitations on the power of dismissal. Whether these conclusions are supportable or whether for other compelling reasons employers should, as a matter of policy, be held liable to at-will
employees discharged in circumstances for which no liability has
existed at common law, are issues better left to resolution a t the
hands of the Legislature. In addition to the fundamental question
whether such liability should be recognized in New York, of no
less practical importance is the definition of its configuration if it
is to be recognized."'

The Court also felt that the dislocation in expectations that would
be created by an abusive discharge cause of action was too great to
be supported solely by a decisional law basis.""
with the repeated attempts to have the Court of Appeals recognize a common-law right of privacy, so too in this area, the Court indicated
its desire to defer to the Legislature.l16
The Court's fears about the disruption of stable expectations
are, the writer believes, grossly exaggerated. Court-ordered reinstatement and back wages, as well as punitive damages, are already
within the borders of New York law in sex, race, and religious bias

112. See id. at 297-98, 448 N.E.2d at 87, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
113. See id. at 298,448 N.E.2d at 87,461 N.Y.S.2d at 233. Plaintiff was over 50 yeam
old. His age discrimination complaint was rejected by the appellate division as time-barred,
but was reinstated by the Court of Appeals. See id. at 297,306-07,448 N.E.2d at 87,92,461
N.Y.S.2d at 233, 238.
114. Id. at 301, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
115. See id. at 302, 448 N.E.2d at 90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
116. See id.
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cases.l17 The perennial judicial fear that a new tort law duty will
unleash an unacceptable horde of litigants has never materialized
before; it would not now."s
Regardless of the direction taken by sister states, it is within
the power of the Court of Appeals to recognize the tort of abusive
discharge. Employment is increasingly regarded as a property
right, the deprivation of which should not occur for arbitrary or
capricious reasons. An additional major policy reason for recognizing a cause of action for abusive discharge lies in the reality that
some employment terminations follow an employee's exposure of
corrupt or illegal practices of the employer. The employee may, as
in Murphy, reveal the problems internally, or resort may be had to
the police, legislative bodies, or the media. The activity of whistle
blowing, although certainly prone to abuse by disaffected employees, should be supported by public policy through a cause of action
for abusive discharge. In the critical field of environmental protection, for example, society needs to be protected from illegal
hazards, the revelation of which can often only come from employees of violators. Because employment termination usually occurs
after an employee reveals inforxation of improper or criminal activities, protection must be afforded to whistle blowers.
Because of the political and economic interests involved, the
writer is not sanguine over the likelihood of a legislatively created
cause of action for abusive discharge. This is a matter with which
the Court of Appeals can deal and the Court should have recog-'
nized the common-law right sought by the plaintiff in Murphy.

B. Privacy and Publicity
In the absence of either a legislative or statutory general right
of privacy, litigants in New York continue to depend, in many instances, on section fifty-one of the Civil Rights Law."s In some

117. See, e.g., Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52 N.Y.2d 72,
79, 417 N.E.2d 525, 529, 436 N.Y.S.2d 231, 235 (1980) (religious bias); Batavia Lodge v.
State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 146,316 N.E.2d 318, 320, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 27
(1974) (racial bias); Mize v. State Div. of Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d 53, 56, 304 N.E.2d 231,
233, 349 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366-67 (1973) (sex bias); N.Y. EXEC.LAW$3 296(1)(a), 297(4)(c)(iii)
(McKinney 1982).
118. For a refutation of the standard argument against extending duties, see Judge
Meyer's dissent in Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d a t 314-16, 448 N.E.2d a t 97, 461 N.Y.S.2d a t 243
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
119. See N.Y. CN. RIGHTSLAW$ 51 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
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instances, resort to the Civil Rights Law is inappropriate, but this
practice will continue as long as New York remains in the minority
of states which do not recognize a right of privacy.
The Court of Appeals in Welch v. Mr. Christmas Inc.120affirmed an award of both compensatory and exemplary damages to
an actor whose commercial for the defendant was broadcast after
the contract for its use expired.12' Although the commercial was
aired by a distributor and not by the defendant, the defendant was
liable because it "had actively encouraged the maximum use of the
commercial in order to sell Christmas trees and had placed no restrictions on the use of the commercial by its distributors, and [its
president] was sure that he had not received back all of the prints
sent
In another Court of Appeals decision, the Court refused to apply section fifty-one of the Civil Rights Law for the benefit of ac~ ~ her
tress Brooke Shields in a media-publicized a ~ t i 0 n . lWith
mother's consent, Shields had posed at the age of ten for the defendant who now wished to publish the pictures. The plaintiff
sought to enjoin photos of her frolicking nude in a bathtub.lP4This
action was complicated by the issue of the plaintifPs infant status
a t the time the contract was executed. The Court discussed the
nature of child modeling careers and concluded that the parents
enjoyed the right to enter into contracts which, under the Civil
Rights Law, could not be disaffirmed by the model on attaining the
age of majority.125The Court noted that the photos in question
were not pornographic, a factor apparently relevant in denying the
plaintiff the injunctive relief sought.le6
In dissent, Judge Jasen disagreed with the majority's application of section fifty-one, noting:
The majority holds, as a matter of law, not only in this case
but as to all present and future consents executed by parents on
behalf of children pursuant to sections 50 and 51 of the Civil
Rights Law, that once a parent consents to the invasion of pri-

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

57 N.Y.2d 143, 440 N.E.2d 1317, 454 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1982).
See id. at 146, 440 N.E.2d at 1319, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
Id. at 146, 440 N.E.2d at 1319,454 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
See Shields v. Gross, 58 N.Y.2d 338, 448 N.E.2d 108, 461 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1983).
Id. at 342, 448 N.E.2d at 109,461 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
See id. at 345, 448 N.E.2d at 111, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
See id. at 346, 448 N.E.2d at 112, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
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vacy of a chid, the child is forever bound by that consent and
may never disaffirm the continued invasion of his or her privacy,
even where the continued invasion of the child's privacy may
cause the child enormous embarrassment, distress and humiliation.la7

Judge Jasen's analysis recognized that section fifty-one should be
interpreted to afford plaintiffs a right to prevent and enjoin ongoing commercial exploitation of their likenesses, based on prior parental consent, after they become legal adults. It is clear, however,
that section fifty-one was never intended to vitiate accepted doctrines with regard to disavowal of contracts executed in infancy.12s
Judge Jasen correctly recognized that the real issue in Shields
was the protection of exploitable infants at the point when they
become legally competent to manage their own affairs. Section
fifty-one should allow a person, obligated during infancy by contracts entered into by parents, to halt the commercial use of his or
her name and to forego both the benefits and the costs involved in
such use. As neither the text nor the legislative history of section
fifty-one precludes such a possibility, the Court of Appeals decided
Shields incorrectly.
Allegations of violations of New York's limited right of privacy
as codified in section fifty-one of the Civil Rights Law are frequently countered by first amendment defenses. In Davis v. High
Society Magazine, Inc.,lZ9 a famous female pugilist sought damages for the publication of a photo, allegedly of her and naming her
as the subject, showing her bare-breasted in a boxing ring. Revers-

127. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
128. As Judge Jasen stated:
Two factors distinguish sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law from those statutory provisions which do, in certain contexts, abolish the minor's right to disaffirm a
contract. The first is that in all cases when the Legislature has intended to do so,
they have made their intention clear by specific language which directly refers to
the infant's common-law right. The absence of any reference in the Civil Rights
Law to the minor's right to disaffirm a contract, especially when it is clear that the
right to disaffirm was well established, indicates that the Legislature did not intend
to affect that right. Secondly, unlike the other kinds of contracts which the Legislature has designated as immune from the minor's right to disaffirm, it cannot be said
that a contract releasing all rights to photographs or even limited rights to those
pictures is necessarily beneficial to the infant. This is even more true when the
pictures, as in this case, are of the variety which can be exploited in the future or
used in publications of questionable taste.
Id. at 351-52, 448 N.E.2d at 114-15, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 260-61.
129. 90 A.D.2d 374, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (2d Dep't 1982).
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ing the trial court, the Second Department found that the photo in
question was used for news purposes and was also protected by the
first amendment in the event that the photo complained of was not
of the plaintiff, although she was identified as the subject.1a0
Although the photo was not of the plaintiff, plaintiff was a
well known female boxer and was, therefore, a limited purpose
public figure. Plaintiff thus had the burden of proving actual malice on the part of the publisher for being misrepresented in the
photo caption. The court held that a substantial question of actual
malice existed and denied the plaintiffs summary judgment
motion.1s1
In Delan v. CBS, Inc.,ls2 the f i s t amendment again provided a
defense against a section fifty-one claim. The plaintiff, a mentally
ill patient in a state hospital, appeared for about four seconds in a
nationally televised one hour telecast. He was clearly recognizablelSSand had signed a consent form.lS4The Second Department,
in reversing the trial court, found the news and public interest aspects of the case to be controlling.lS6

130. See id. at 383,457 N.Y.S.2d a t 315-16. According to the court,
[i]t has long been recognized that use of a name or picture by the media in connection with a newsworthy item is protected by the First Amendment and is not considered a use for purposes of trade within the ambit of the Civil Rights Law . .
This is true irrespective of the fact that such publications are carried on largely,
and even primarily, to make a profit. More generally, it has been recognized that
certain publications are of public interest and, therefore, protected, even if not
strictly concerned with news or nonfictional material . . .
Id. at 379, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
131. See id. at 383-84, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t 316.
132. 91 A.D.2d 255, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (2d Dep't 1983).
133. Id. at 256, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t 611.
134. Id. a t 258, 458 N.Y.S.2d a t 612. The writer is troubled about the validity of this
consent. Although only patients certified by one of the hospital's physicians as being capable
of giving consent were allowed to actually consent, it is clear that hospital authorities were
cooperating with the defendant. Without patients there would be no documentary. All the
patients who signed consent forms suffered from one type or another of psychotic illness. No
therapeutic reason for permitting the patients to participate in the filming was shown and
there may well be none. Although there is a definite public value in showing what goes on
inside mental hospitals, the writer feels the plaints was exploited, perhaps for the best of
motives, but exploited nonetheless. Because section 51 of the Civil Rights Law properly
affords no relief here, it is suggested that legislative action is needed to protect confined
psychiatric patients against the type of hospital discretion exercised in this case.
135. See id. at 259,458 N.Y.S.2d at 613. The court stated:
In our opinion, the documentary film with which this case is concerned dealt with a
matter of legitimate public interest, i.e., the deinstitutionalization of mental patients and their placement in an outpatient program designed to benefit both them-

..

.
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C. Libel and Slander
In Buckley v. Litman,lS8 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
libel action of a physician's assistant against his former physician
employer. The defendant, having suspected the plaintiff of tampering with patient records and getting no satisfactory answer from
the plaintiff, wrote to the appropriate licensure board. A carbon
copy was sent to the county sheriff and to a physician who had just
hired the plaintifT.lS7The Court of Appeals found a qualified privilege attached to the challenged carbon copy mailing of the letter.lS8
Without proof of malice the motion was dismissed. It is regrettable
that dismissal was not granted by the trial court. As a matter of
policy, in the very sensitive area of assuring competent health care,
trial courts should be alert to nonmeritorious actions for libel. The
qualified privilege must be applied a t the earliest stage, when the
facts clearly indicate its appropriateness, so that people with information about negligent or dishonest professionals will not be discouraged from taking action. That the defendant had to appeal the
case to the highest court in New York to obtain a dismissal of the
action highlights the reasons so often given by doctors and hospital
administrators for not reducing critical observations to writing.lSB
The Second Department, in Park Knoll Associates u.
Schmidt,140 decided an important libel case of first impression.
The leader of a tenants' association drafted and mailed a letter to
the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal

selves and society as a whole. I t involved a critical review of the mental hygiene
program in this State as a matter of general and public concern, and the telecast,
therefore, was clearly a privileged subject.

Id.
136. 57 N.Y.2d 516, 443 N.E.2d 469, 457 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1982).
137. Id. a t 519, 443 N.E.2d at 469-70, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t 221-22.
138. See id. at 520,443 N.E.2d a t 470, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t 222.
139. The writer often has been asked a t seminars and lectures about the issue of liabiiity for writing truthful, e.g., unflattering or negative, reference letters and for reporting incompetent professional practices to the State. Doctors, as a group, have a widespread perception that lawyers encourage the filiig of vexatious libel suits to deter the reporting of
their client's unethical or dangerous practices. Whether true or not, the perception operates
to inhibit those with the most information from speaking out. The writer feels that the
Legislature should create a right to attorney's fees for the successful defendant in a libel
action where the action is dismissed on grounds of qualified privilege. Such a step would
free doctors from some of the fears which now restrain them from undertaking the role that
public policy and common sense dictates they should play in policing their profession.
140. 89 A.D.2d 164, 454 N.Y.S.2d 901 (2d Dep't 1982).
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complaining about alleged illegal rent transactions concerning
members of the tenants' association. The appellate division found
that absolute immunity applied to the communications in question.141 The court found that all the considerations supporting absolute immunity for quasi-judicial proceedings apply to complaints
before the State housing agen~y."~The court recognized the role
played by tenant leaders in this way:
Assuming, as plaintiff alleges, that the complaints at issue
were authored by defendant in her capacity as tenant representative we hold that they constituted a pertinent part of a quasijudicial proceeding and were within the absolute immunity afforded statements made therein .
The defendant, as president of Park Knoll Tenants Association, held a position consistent with that of many other concerned
tenant association leaders throughout this State. Such persons are
mostly unpaid, dedicated and energetic individuals who attempt
to provide advice and disseminate information to tenants, who
are sometimes of advanced age or suffer handicaps such as language difficulties, or who may be generally unfamiliar with their
rights and remedies, so as to provide some counterbalance against
the seeming omnipotence of their landlords. To rule against extension of the absolute privilege to this defendant would undoubtedly have a chilling effect upon any tenant representative
whose counsel has been sought to assist a tenant in composing a
formal complaint against a land10rd.l~~

...

Park Knoll Associates reflects, on its face, the defendant landlord's attempt to stifle tenant protests through the pressure of libel
law. The recognition of an absolute privilege for tenant leaders
when communicating with state, and presumably also local, authorities responsible for tenant protection, is a major step forward
in safeguarding tenant rights. This is a highly volatile area with an
invariable imbalance of power and resources favoring the landlord.
The Second Department's holding should be affirmed and extended throughout the State.
Libel can be accomplished pictorially as well as with words. A
painting with the quixotic and engaging title "The Mugging of the

141. See id. a t 164-65, 454 N.Y.S.2d a t 902-03.
142. See id. a t 174, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 907-08.
143. Id. a t 175-76, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09 (citation omitted).
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Muse" did not qualify as libelous in Silberman v. Georges.14' The
trial court was reversed and the complaint dismissed on the finding
that the painting in question, rather than defaming the plaints,
was "obviously allegorical and symbolic;" the picture expressed
"critical opinion only at most.""6
The Fourth Department, in Scacchetti v. Gannett Co., I ~ C . , " ~
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant. A newspaper report had quoted the plaintiff, a police sergeant, as voicing obscenities about the United States District
Court judge who had just sentenced his brother. The supreme
court granted s.ummary judgment on its own motion, finding that
no cause of action had been stated. The appellate court applied the
test that requires that an article be read as a whole. "Measured by
these standards, the newspaper account concerning plaintiff can
certainly be interpreted as subjecting him to public contempt,
aversion or disgrace and tending to injure him in his profession as
a law enforcement officer. The publication is thus arguably libelous
per se.""?
With New York City rental housing vacancies below the two
per cent level, cooperative conversion campaigns have become bitter contests. It was inevitable, therefore, that allegations of libel in
such a contest would reach the courts. The First Department, in
Tanner & Gilbert v. V e r n ~ , " ~reversed the trial court and dismissed a law firm's libel complaint. The law firm, which represented three tenants, alleged that it had been libelled by a statement made by non-client tenants concerning the amount of its
legal fees.*4sThe court found that the firm, which had become involved in a bitter dispute, "made its conduct and its claim for legal
fees an issue for discussion."160 Because the allegedly defamatory
statements had been made only to other tenants interested in the
dispute, a qualified privilege existed.

144. 91 A.D.2d 520,456 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1st Dep't 1982) (rnem.).
145. Id. at 521, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
146. 90 A.D.2d 985, 456 N.Y.S.2d 580 (4th Dep't 1982) (rnem.).
147. Id. at 986, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
148. 92 A.D.2d 802, 460 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1st Dep't 1983) (mem.).
149. Id. at 803,460 N.Y.S.2d at 49. The law firm sought over two million dollars in fees
from both retained tenant-clients and non-clients who, the firm claimed, received a benefit
from the firm's activities. In a related action, consolidated with this case on appeal, the First
Department dismissed a suit for the fees brought by this law firm.
150. Id.
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Liability for libel was placed largely on the shoulders of a
newspaper reporter in Gaeta v. New York News, Inc.l6I The plaintiff, who had never been a public figure or official, sued the Daily
~ ~ reporter's
News, its publisher and editor, and a r e ~ 0 r t e r . lThe
article implied that the plaintiffs ex-husband became mentally ill
partly because their son committed suicide knowing "his mother
dated other men."16s As no negligence was established against either the editor or publisher, individual liability fell on the reporter
whose actions were judged by the emerging standard of reasonable
care for newspaper r e ~ 0 r t e r s . l ~ ~
A diversity libel action, Rudin v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.,lU6
provides a lengthy digression on variant meanings of the term
"mouthpiece" as applied to lawyers. The defendant had published
an article concerning an investment made by "Frank Sinatra and a
group . . . including his attorney, Milton R ~ d i n . " ' Rudin
~ ~ replied
with a "letter to the editor" which the defendant published under
the caption "SINATRA'S
After reviewing
psycholinguistic research, the court found that although the term
"mouthpiece" connoted a negative image of lawyers, the plaintiff
did not identify himself as an attorney in his letter to the editor
and it was doubtful that readers would recall that plaintiff had
been referred to as an attorney in the investment article published
two months earlier.168The general use of "mouthpiece" to describe
a spokesperson was not, in the context of the evidence presented,
defamatory.169

D. Miscellaneous Intentional Torts
The pirating and illegal production and distribution of recorded music was the subject of the Court of Appeals decision in

151. 115 Misc. 2d 483, 454 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1982).
152. See id. a t 484, 488, 454 N.Y.S.2d a t 180, 183.
153. Id. a t 483-84, 454 N.Y.S.2d a t 180.
154. The court noted that with little effort, the reporter would have been aware that
she had been given inaccurate information. See id. at 487, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 182. The standard of care required in this case is hardly burdensome and little interference with obtaining and publishing a newspaper story is created.
155. 557 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
156. Id. a t 536 (quoting Barron's, Nov. 27, 1978, at 38).
157. Id. (quoting Barron's, Jan. 15, 1979, at 7).
158. See id. at 545.
159. Id. a t 546.
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Sporn v. MCA Records, Inc.lBOThe specific issue was whether a

cause of action accrued when the illegal appropriation began or at
the time the defendant exploited the plaintifF's property. Stated
otherwise, the Court of Appeals was asked to rescue the plaintiff
from the consequences of not bringing an action in a timely manner because the appropriation allegedly began in 1965.
The p l a i n t s raised the theory that the defendant's action
should be viewed as continuing trespasses, with a new three year
statute of limitations accruing with each misuse of the recordings.
The Court majority found that conversion had taken place in 1965
and the p l a i n t s was thus time-barred from prosecuting his claims.
[I]t seems abundantly clear that plaintWs cause of action is one
for conversion and not for trespass. The complaint alleges that
although the plaintiff regained his rights to the master recording
of "Get a Job" by operation of the oral agreement he had with
Ember's president, the defendant, since 1965, has been using that
master recording as his own by manufacturing, distributing and
selling records and otherwise commercially exploiting that master
recording which it is claimed is the property of the plaintiff.
These allegations amount to more than mere interference. The
conduct of the defendant certainly constituted a denial of both
the plaintWs right to the master recording and a total usurping
of plaintWs right to possess the master rec~rding.'~'

Three members of the Court dissented claiming that
[tlhe action, then, is not simply for misappropriation or conversion of the record, but for its repeated and continuing use thereafter to manufacture and sell reproductions in violation of plaint W s rights. Short of determining that there can be adverse
. the complaint cannot be dispossession of an intangible,
missed as barred by lirnitation~.'~~

..

The Court of Appeals correctly decided this case. The plaintiff
was aware of the misuse of the master recording in sufficient time
to have begun an action. What he could not know, of course, was
that someone would find the recording commercially attractive in
succeeding years and would use it for new albums. The measure of
damages, had the action been brought at the proper time, would

160. 58 N.Y.2d 482, 448 N.E.2d 1324, 462 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1983).
161. Id. at 488,448 N.E.2d at 1327, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
162. Id. at 490,448 N.E.2d at 1328, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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probably be less than if the Court had accepted the continuing
trespass theory. The defendant, however, by its clear exercise of
dominion over the master recording in 1965 to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs rights, committed conversion and the cause of action accrued at that point.
An interesting diversity action considering New York fraud
law was decided by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Idrees v. American University. 168 The
plaintiff had resigned from a technician's position at a New York
hospital to enroll at a medical school in the British West Indies.
Plaintiff Idrees claimed he was induced to enroll at the defendant's
school by an advertisement in the New York Times and by material that the school sent to him. He alleged fraud because, on registering at the school, he found that both the faculty and the facilities promised were nonexistent.la
The district court judge found that the defendant both intentionally and recklessly deceived applicants, including the plaintiff,
and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages.ls6Punitive dam-

163. 546 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
164. Among the discrepancies between promise and reality were, as presented in plaintiffs amended complaint:
1. [Tlhe school had a library with periodicals, books and audio-visual aids. These
representations were false as the library in fact had no periodicals, books or audiovisual aids.
2. [The school] had laboratory facilities that included microscopes, microscopic
slides and skeletons. These representations were false as there were no microscopes,
microscopic slides or skeletons in the laboratory.
3. [Flor the class in histology [each student] would be provided with a set of prepared slides and a microscope. These representations were false as he was not provided with said slides or microscope.
4. Defendant in [its bulletin] published a photograph identified as the Montserrat
Hospital calculated to give plaintiff the impression that the hospital and the school
had a relationship that would enable plaintiff and other students to use the facilities of said hospital. Plaintiff was in fact deceived by the publication of said photograph inasmuch as neither he nor other students were able to use any of the facilities of the hospital.
5. [A] semester would consist of four classes commencing May 14,1980. Such representation was false as only two classes s k t e d on that date. Defendant represented
that the laboratory class would start on May 14,1980.Such representation was false
as such class did not start until June 10, 1982.
6. .The number of faculty members at the school was less than one-half of the number represented by defendant. The courses in fact given were worthless and one was
taught by a student enrolled at the school at that time.
Id. at 1345 (quoting Plaintiffs complaint at 111 3-7).
165. See id. at 1350.
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ages were, however, denied, with the court finding that the acts of
the defendant fell below the standard required for the award of
such damages under New York law.lae
The writer believes the court erred seriously in not awarding
punitive damages after ffirmatively finding multiple acts of deception, all of which formed the basis for the plaintiffs decision to
attend the defendant's school. The plaintiff moved to a foreign
country and disrupted his life. He discovered that his dream of
obtaining a real medical education was unrealizable. Of equal importance, public policy dictates that schools that deceive applicants and that promise to deliver quality medical instruction, but
have no capability of so doing, are dangerous to public welfare.
The plaintiffs compensatory damages were not great. No real deterrent to the continued advertising of the defendant's school in
New York emerges from the judgment. Punitive damages would or
could have constituted a needed deterrent.
New York courts were plagued last year, as every year, with
attempts to frame otherwise unsustainable allegations within the
prima facie tort category.Ia7This cause of action, limited though it
may be, will be deprived of all utility if counsel continue to allege
it as a matter of course and with no appreciation of its elements.

VI. CONCLUSION
The shape of New York tort law remained fairly constant during the past year. The only certain prognostication for next year's

166. See id. a t 1351. The court relied upon Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179
N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961), for the punitive damage standard. According to the
Sheldon court, as noted in Idrees, see 546 F. Supp. a t 1351,
[plunitive or exemplary damages have been allowed in cases where the wrong complained of is morally culpable, or is actuated by evil and reprehensible motives, not
only to punish the defendant but to deter him, as well as others, who might otherwise be so prompted, from indulging in similar conduct in the future.
10 N.Y.2d a t 404, 179 N.E.2d a t 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d a t 490.
167. See Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 561 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Filmways Pictures, Inc. v. Marks Polarized Corp., 552 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Greenfield
v. Kanwit, 546 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Roberts v. Pollack, 92 A.D.2d 440, 461
N.Y.S.2d 272 (1st Dep't 1983); Abelow v. Grossman, 91 A.D.2d 553, 457 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1st
Dep't 1982) (rnem.); Wehringer v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 585,457 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1st
Dep't 1982) (rnem.), aff'd mem., 59 N.Y.2d 688, 450 N.E.2d 223, 463 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1983);
T.N.J. Holding v. Biaggi, Ehrlich & Lang, 90 A.D.2d 547,455 N.Y.S.2d 123 (2d Dep't 1982)
(rnem.); Howard v. Block, 90 A.D.2d 455, 454 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1st Dep't 1982) (rnem.);
Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d 315, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1982).
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Survey is that New York tort law will continue to reflect the evolving standards of civil wrongs in this State.
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